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In this paper, we develop a simple empirical method to test two alternative versions of the Melitz (2003)
model, one with global fixed export costs and one with bilateral fixed export costs.  With global costs,
import sales per product variety (relative to domestic sales per variety) are decreasing in variable trade
barriers, as a result of adjustment occurring along the intensive margin of trade.  With bilateral costs,
imports per product variety are increasing in fixed trade costs, due to adjustment occurring along the
extensive margin.  We apply our approach to data on imports of U.S. motion pictures in 46 countries
over 1995-2006.  Imports per product variety are decreasing in geographic distance, linguistic distance,
and other measures of trade costs, consistent with adjustment to these costs occurring along the intensive
margin.  There is relatively little variation in the number of U.S. movies that countries import but wide
variation in the box-office revenues per movie.  The data thus appear to reject the bilateral-fixed-export-cost
model in favor of the global-fixed-export-cost model.
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I  Introduction 
  Recent literature identifies patterns of export behavior that are inconsistent with 
traditional models of international trade.  Most manufacturing plants in the US and 
France do not export any output and those that do are larger and more productive than 
those that do not (Bernard and Jensen, 1999 and 2004; Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz, 
2004).  Melitz (2003), in widely cited work, develops a model with firm heterogeneity 
and fixed export costs that can account for these phenomena.
1  Because of fixed trade 
charges, only more productive plants find it profitable to sell goods abroad.
2 
  Fixed trade costs imply adjustment in trade volumes may occur along both the 
intensive margin (value of trade per product) and extensive margin (number of products 
traded).  In the standard monopolistic competition model, consumer love of variety leads 
all products to be exported, meaning trade varies at the intensive margin only (Helpman 
and Krugman, 1985).  A fall in transport costs causes exports of all products to increase, 
consistent with the robust negative coefficient on distance in the gravity model of trade 
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). With fixed export costs and firm heterogeneity, a 
fall in transport costs may cause trade volumes to increase both through existing 
exporters exporting more and new firms beginning to export.  Bernard, Jensen, Redding, 
and Schott (2007) find that most variation in US merchandise exports is at the extensive 
margin, with smaller countries importing fewer US products.
3  They also find that the 
negative gravity coefficient for distance is due mostly to adjustment at the extensive 
margin, with US manufacturers exporting fewer products to more distant countries. 
                                                 
1 For other theoretical work on firm heterogeneity and trade see Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003). 
2 When applied to aggregate data, this framework yields a gravity specification that can account for why 
many country pairs do not trade (Helpman, Melitz, Rubinstein, 2007; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2007). 
3 In related work, Chaney (2006) finds that variation in trade cost elasticities across sectors is consistent 
with adjustment to trade occurring at the extensive margin.   2
 Despite  abundant  indirect  evidence that fixed trade costs exist, we know little 
about their nature.  While we can measure variable trade barriers in the form of tariffs or 
transport fees, no similar data exist for expenses that are fixed.  If fixed export costs are 
bilateral, such that firms incur a charge to enter each new foreign market, small countries 
will be disadvantaged in global trade.  However, if fixed export costs are largely global in 
nature, such that once firms establish a global distribution network they face only 
variable charges in adding new markets, small countries are not at a disadvantage and it is 
only unproductive firms that fail to participate in trade. 
  In this paper, we develop a simple empirical method to test two alternative 
versions of the Melitz (2003) model, one with global fixed export costs and one with 
bilateral fixed export costs.  With global fixed export costs, import sales per product 
variety (relative to domestic sales per variety) are decreasing in variable trade barriers, as 
a result of adjustment occurring along the intensive margin of trade.  With bilateral fixed 
export costs, however, imports per product variety are increasing in fixed trade costs, due 
to adjustment occurring along the extensive margin.  Both models produce an empirical 
specification that has sales per foreign variety relative to sales per domestic variety as the 
dependent variable and trade barriers as independent variables.  To test one model against 
the other, one simply examines the sign of the coefficients on trade costs. 
  An advantage of our approach is that we need not take a stand on which trade 
barriers represent fixed impediments and which variable impediments.  The empirical 
literature offers little guidance on this issue.  Standard gravity variables – distance, 
language, colonial history – are likely correlated with variable and fixed barriers.  We 
exploit the divergent predictions of the two alternative models for whether adjustment to   3
trade barriers occurs on the intensive or extensive margin, making our approach 
applicable in a wide variety of empirical settings. 
  We apply our specification to data on imports of US motion pictures.  The 
characteristics of the film industry are consistent with the assumptions of the Melitz 
framework.  Fixed costs are important in movie production and studios differentiate their 
film product (De Vany, 2004).  There is heterogeneity in movie performance, with box-
office revenues for US films being asymptotically Pareto-distributed (De Vany and 
Walls, 1997 and 2004), matching the distributional assumptions in Melitz (2003) and 
most extensions.  Not all US movies are exported, with no country exhibiting more than 
two-thirds of the movies the US produces in a given year.  Data for the analysis cover 
box-office revenues for domestic and US movies in 46 countries over 1995-2006, as 
collected by ScreenDigest.com, an entertainment industry consultancy.  We also make 
use of data on national trade barriers in motion pictures from various sources. 
  A broader motivation for studying motion pictures is that the vast majority of 
empirical work on trade is for manufacturing, with relatively little work to date on 
services.  Movies are representative of other information services, including music, 
publishing, software, television, and video games, which are responsible for a growing 
share of US trade.  These “copyright” industries tend to have large fixed production costs 
(associated with creating an initial film print, music recording, or software program) and 
small marginal production costs (associated with producing additional copies).  In 2005, 
copyright industries accounted for 7% of US GDP; US movies, TV, and videos had 
foreign sales plus exports of $20 billion, just below that for US pharmaceuticals.
4  While 
                                                 
4 Together, US copyright industries had exports plus foreign sales of $110 billion in 2005, exceeding the 
total for US chemical products and motor vehicles combined (Siwek, 2006).   4
one might presume copyrighted services can be exported at little expense, we know little 
about trade barriers for these products.
5  For movies, music, and software, language and 
culture may affect consumer demand and the cost of marketing goods across borders.  
While the physical cost of delivering information services may be low, the barriers 
consumers face in gaining access to them may not be. 
  Our main findings are that imports per product variety are decreasing in 
geographic distance, linguistic distance, and other measures of trade barriers, in a manner 
consistent with adjustment to these barriers occurring along the intensive rather than the 
extensive margin.  There is relatively little variation in the number of US movies that 
countries import but wide variation in the box-office revenues per movie, with countries 
more distant from the US spending less on the US movies that they see.  Argentina, for 
instance, imports roughly the same number of US movies each year as Germany, though 
the box office revenues per US film there are far lower.  The data reject the bilateral-
fixed-export-cost model in favor of the global-fixed-export-cost model, implying even 
small countries have access to a wide variety of US motion pictures. 
  Interestingly, the specification of the Melitz model preferred by the data is quite 
similar to that for the standard monopolistic competition model (e.g., Krugman, 1980; 
Helpman and Krugman, 1985), which has no firm heterogeneity or fixed export costs.  
This is because in both the monopolistic competition model and the Melitz model with 
global fixed export costs adjustment to trade costs occurs along the intensive margin.   
Obviously, the standard monopolistic competition model fails in our data by not 
accounting for why some US movies are not exported. 
 
                                                 
5 There is a growing literature on motion picture trade.  See Hanson and Xiang (2008) for references.   5
II Theory 
  In this section, we develop two versions of the Melitz model.  In one, fixed 
exports costs are bilateral, incurred each time a producer enters a new export market; in 
the other, they are global, incurred once, when a producer starts exporting.  The two 
models yield different predictions for how trade costs affect box office revenues per 
movie.  We also explore how fixed production costs impact trade patterns, depending on 
whether a portion of these costs are incurred after producers learn their type. 
 
IIA Model Setup  
  There are many sectors, over which consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences, 
and many countries, where u indexes the exporter and k indexes the importer.  We focus 
on the movie industry and leave other sectors in the background.  As movies are 
consumed in discrete units, we adopt a discrete choice framework (e.g., Anderson, de 
Palma and Thisse, 1992; Feenstra, 2004). Our model preserves the main features of 
Melitz (2003) and allows for endogenous markups, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2005).
6  
Movies are subject to cultural discount (Waterman, 2005).  For a consumer in 
country k, a movie from country u (the US) reduces utility by δuk as compared with a 
domestic movie, where δuk > 0.  δuk represents the portion of a movie’s value that is lost 
in translation in moving from one country to another.  We expect δuk to be lower the more 
similar are two countries’ culture and language. 
Movies are also subject to fixed and variable trade costs.  Variable specific trade 
                                                 
6 Melitz (2003) assumes a representative consumer with CES preferences.  Anderson et al. (1992) show 
that if goods are consumed in continuous units, a discrete choice model generates the same market demand 
functions as a representative consumer with CES preferences.  As we assume individuals consume either 
zero or one unit of a movie, the demand functions we derive differ somewhat from Melitz.  Even so, our 
qualitative predictions for the relationship between trade and trade costs are very similar to what obtains 
under CES preferences, as we show in an Appendix.    6
fees, defined as tuk > 0, include tariffs and surcharges on foreign movie revenues 
(Marvasti and Canterbery, 2005), transaction costs in negotiating contracts between US 
movie distributors and foreign movie exhibitors (Gil and LaFontaine, 2007),
7 advertising 
expenses (which are increasing in the length of time a movie spends in theatres), and film 
printing expenses (which are increasing in the number of the number of times a movie is 
shown and the number of theatres in which it appears).
8  Fixed export costs, which we 
introduce formally below, are associated with allocating the right to distribute a movie in 
different countries, creating an international marketing campaign, editing movies for 
foreign audiences, and adding subtitles or dubbing movie dialogue.  Fixed costs may be 
market specific (if each country requires its own marketing campaign) or global in nature 
(if a single marketing campaign can serve multiple countries).  Obviously, fixed and 
variable trade charges may have common underlying determinants, with distance, 
language, and the costs of enforcing contracts possibly affecting both.
9 
In country k, consumer o picks one movie from nk domestic and foreign movies, 
deriving utility Vjk
o = vjk + εjk
o if she chooses movie j.  εjk
o is an i.i.d. random variable of 
the double exponential distribution with mean 0 and variance ρ
2/6, and vjk is given by 
vjk = λjk − δjk –  tjk − pjk,          ( 1 )  
where pjk is the price of movie j net of policy trade barriers (and we set δkk = tkk = 0). A 
demand shifter, λjk, incorporates heterogeneity in movies. A movie with a high λjk is 
                                                 
7 Gil and LaFontaine (2007) find that in the Spanish movie industry distributors sign an initial contract for 
sharing revenues with movie exhibitors, which may be renegotiated multiple times, as a movie reveals itself 
to be more or less popular than expected.  Contracting costs are thus a function of the level of revenues and 
not simply the discrete outcome of whether or not a movie is shown. 
8 The Motion Picture Association (2003) reports that for the average US movie in 2003, 65% of total costs 
were due to film production and 35% were due to marketing (which includes making film prints; 
advertising on radio, TV, newspapers and other media; and other promotional activities). 
9 We take as given the number of movie theatres in each country.  While expanding the number of theatres 
is a fixed cost in distributing movies, it is not one that is specific to individual films.    7
popular (E.T., Titanic) and one with a low λjk is unpopular (Ishtar, Gigli).  We assume the 
popularity of a movie does not depend on the country in which it is shown (λjk = λj for all 
k) and that λj is drawn from a common distribution, G(λ).
10  Introducing heterogeneity in 
demand rather than in marginal costs, as in Melitz (2003), keeps variation in admission 
prices for movies within a country compressed, consistent with the data (De Vany, 2004). 
  Applying results in Anderson et al. (1992), we can show that the box-office 
revenues (total sales) of movie j produced in country u and shown in country k are 
() ( ) exp , juk juk uk j uk uk juk k sp t t p A =+ − − − λδ      ( 2 )  
where / kk k AY M =α and ( ) ( ) exp l kl k l k l k M pt v =+ ∑ , Yk is income, α is the expenditure 
share for the movie industry, and pjuk is the price of movie j net of policy trade barriers in 
k.  Mk captures market competitiveness in country k, similar to the CES price index.   
Equation (2) resembles a CES demand function with each movie as a product variety. 
Box-office revenues of domestically produced movie h in country k equal, 
exp( ) hkk hk h hk k sp p A =− λ .         ( 3 )  
We assume movie production occurs in four steps. (i) A producer in country u 
hires fE units of country-u labor to produce a master film print, which is a sunk labor 
input. (ii) The producer draws a λ from the distribution G(λ). (iii) The producer uses a 
variable labor input to exhibit the movie to an audience, with input costs incurred in the 
country where the audience is located.  For each unit of the movie shown in country k, 
the producer hires one unit of country-k labor. And (iv) the producer collects profits. 
By assumption (ii), all fixed production costs are incurred before the popularity of 
                                                 
10 The top grossing movies tend to be the same across national markets.  For 2003 to 2005, our data show 
the top ten movies by box office revenue for each country.  In each year, at least six movies appear in the 
top ten lists of two thirds or more of the countries.  Waterman (2005) provides similar evidence.   8
a movie is revealed, which we refer to as a pure sunk cost setting.  This differs from 
Melitz (2003), in which some fixed production costs are incurred after heterogeneity is 
revealed, which we refer to as a partial sunk cost setting.  We first derive results for pure 
sunk costs and later consider partial sunk costs.  Pure sunk costs capture the riskiness and 
short-lived nature of movies.  A strong indicator of a movie’s popularity is the box office 
revenue earned during its first week of release (typically, on the domestic market), by 
which time production and domestic distribution costs have been incurred.  By the end of 
three weeks, the average movie has earned 66% of its total box-office revenues (De Vany 
and Walls, 1999).  As in Melitz (2003), the role of the sunk entry cost is to pin down Nk, 
the number of country-k producers that draw from G(λ).
11 
In our model, each firm produces a single variety, as in Melitz (2003). However, 
our setting also has a multi-product-firm interpretation, consistent with Bernard, Redding 
and Schott (2006).  Most movies are distributed by large movie studios, which are often 
involved in movie production as well.
12  While there are a large number of studios 
worldwide, a half dozen distribute most high-grossing films.
13  One can think of a movie 
studio as a multi-product firm. Within a given year, a studio will release many movies, 
where each movie is a product variety.  The short lived nature of movies allows each 
studio to differentiate its movies in time, avoiding the simultaneous release of two or 
                                                 
11 In an Appendix we derive Nk assuming m identical countries and each country having one sector, as in 
Melitz (2003).  Nk and its counterparts in other countries are jointly determined. 
12 Making a movie involves four stages:  development (securing rights, screen writing, casting, financing), 
production (filming, special effects, music, editing), distribution (marketing, negotiating with theatres), and 
exhibition.  While studios are usually involved in distribution, they have varying roles in earlier stages, 
sometimes handling a movie from start to finish (Paramount and Mission: Impossible II) and sometimes 
buying distribution rights to an already finished movie (20
th Century Fox and Little Miss Sunshine).  US 
antitrust rulings prevent movie studios from owning theatres, meaning studios do not control exhibition. 
13 The major studios (and their corporate parents) are Columbia/MGM (Sony), Paramount (Viacom), 20
th 
Century Fox (News Corp.), Universal Pictures (GE), Disney (Disney), and Warner Bros. (Time-Warner).  
While there is little entry or exit by studios, changes in studio ownership are frequent (Waterman, 2005).   9
more films.  While a studio may produce multiple movie products, it will only produce 
one variety per product.  In this setting, for each product we can still apply assumptions 
(i)-(iv) and proceed with the analysis.
14 
Following Melitz (2003), we assume the movie industry is monopolistically com-
petitive.
15  By (2) and (3), the elasticity of demand for domestic movie h is -phkk and for 
country-u movie j is -(pukj + tuk).  As price increases, demand becomes more elastic and 
markups decrease, as with linear demands in Melitz and Ottaviano (2005). It follows that, 
  phkk = wk + 1,  pukj + tuk = wk + 1 + tuk  → phkk = pjuk = wk + 1 for all u, h, j,   (4) 
where wk is the wage in country k.
16  Because the cultural discount is a source of home 
bias in demand, it does not affect prices (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). Similarly, λj 
affects the quantity demanded but not prices. Equation (4) implies that in market k, the 
prices of domestic and foreign movies (net of policy trade barriers) are the same.   
Once a producer in country k draws its λ, sunk costs have been incurred, implying 
the movie will be made, with pricing given by (4) and sales by (3).  The number of 
country-k movies produced, nkk, is Nk, the number of country-k movies drawn from G(λ), 
                                                 
14 Multi-product firms bring two additional elements into consideration. First, the popularity of a movie 
may depend on the “ability” of its studio. Following Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006), we assume the 
distribution of studio abilities is independent of λ and that the ability of a given studio is common for all 
products. With each studio randomly drawing its ability when it enters the market, studio abilities are given 
for each individual movie.  Second, the entry decisions and numbers of studios in the market may depend 
on studio-level sunk entry costs and per period studio-level fixed costs, as well as studio-level ability. Since 
we lack data on which movies are distributed by which studios, we leave studios in the background of the 
analysis and focus on individual movies.  Some portion of our product-level sunk entry cost fE might be 
indistinguishable from the studio-level fixed cost, but fE also remains in the background of our analysis.  A 
further reason to leave studios in the background is that the studio that distributes a movie abroad may not 
be the same one that distributes it domestically.  US studios frequently use joint ventures to release movies 
abroad.  See McCalman (2004, 2005) on contractual decisions in foreign movie distribution. 
15 Because the number of major movie studios is small, the assumption of monopolistic competition might 
seem questionable.  However, one can view competition in movies as occurring not between studios but 
between the top talents involved in a movie, such as actors, directors, and producers, whose numbers far 
exceed the number of major studios.  To secure the star power of these talents, studios bid for their services 
(Waterman, 2005), driving expected profits toward zero.  
16 The marginal cost of a domestic movie is wk, with market price wk + 1; the marginal cost of a country-u 
movie shown in country k is wk + tuk, with market price wk + tuk + 1.    10
  nkk = k N .           ( 5 )  
To derive sales of domestic movies in country k, we assume that G(·) is exponential, such 
that G(λ) = 1 − d
 κ exp(−λκ), with κ > 0 and λ ∈ [lnd, +∞).  By (3) movie sales, shkk, are 
then Pareto-distributed, and total sales of country-k movies in country k are 
Skk= ln () kh k k d Ns d G
∞
∫ λ .  (In section IV, we examine whether movie revenues are, in fact, 
Pareto.)  For the integrand to be finite, the distribution G(λ) must have a sufficiently thin 
tail, which requires that κ > 1.  It follows that,  
Skk = Nk ln () hkk d sd G
∞
∫ λ  = 










.     (6) 
As expenditure for movies by country k, Ak, increases, or the wage in country k, wk, 
decreases, the total sale of domestic movies in country-k movies increases.
17 
 
IIB Global Fixed Export Costs 
  Consider the producers of country-u movies who would like to export to country 
k.  Exporting requires a global fixed cost of fG units of country-u labor, incurred after the 
drawing of the demand shifter λ.  We allow producers to observe their type before 
making the export decision, consistent with the movie industry where producers release 
films on the domestic market first, and then, if they are sufficiently successful, in theatres 
abroad.
18  Paying this fixed cost allows a country-u movie to be exported to the rest of the 
world.  By (2), a country-u producer of movie j gets revenue sjuk for serving country k.  
Total sales from exporting movie j is then  ku juk s ≠ ∑ ; the profit from exporting movie j is 
                                                 
17 The derivative of lnSkk with respect to wk equals -wk/(1+wk).  
18 Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) find that US movies with stronger domestic market performance tend to 
have higher opening-week box-office revenues when they are released in foreign markets. McCalman 
(2005) shows that movies released simultaneously in the US and a few foreign markets (“day and date” 
releases) are released in other foreign markets with a lag.    11
j
ju u G u eQ fw =−
λ π ,   
(1 ) ku k u k wt
ku uk Qe A
δ −+ + +
≠ = ∑ .      ( 7 )    
Setting πju = 0 yields the cut-off value of λ for a country-u movie to be exported: 





= λ .           ( 8 )  
Equation (8) says that the cut-off value,  u λ , does not vary across importing countries due 
to the global nature of the fixed export cost. Once a movie is shown abroad, it is shown 
around the globe.  Country u thus produces two kinds of movies:  those below the export 
cut-off (λj < u λ ), which are domestic films; and those above, which are shown globally.  
Using  u λ , we can derive (a) the number of country-u movies exported to country 
k, and (b) total sales of country-u movies in country k:  




∫λ λ  = exp( ), uu Nd
κ λ κ −  
(b)  ()
u
uk u juk j SNs d G
∞




ku k u k wt






−+ + + ++
−
.   (9) 
 
To see the intuition behind (9), consider the total sales of country-u movies in country k, 
Suk.  Equation (9b) is a gravity-like prediction in which Suk responds to country-k 
characteristics, such as expenditure, and variable trade barriers.  This variation consists of 
an extensive margin – the number of country-u movies exported to k – and an intensive 
margin – the average sale per country-u movie.  In (9a), the extensive margin is 
exporting-country specific and does not vary with importing-country characteristics.  As 
a result, all variation in Suk occurs along the intensive margin. The fixed export cost does 
not affect the intensive margin because it does not vary across importers. 
Together, equations (5), (6) and (9) imply that:   12
/
ln ln 1 ln ln
/1 1
uk uk uk k
uk uk u uk uk u





=− − + + + ≈− − + ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ++ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
δδ   
               ln , uk uk u tC ≈− − + δ        ( 1 0 )  
where  exp( )/ uu Cd = λ .
19  In equation (10), Suk/nuk and Skk/nkk are the average sales in 
country k of a movie produced in country u and of movies produced domestically.  On 
the left of (10) are average sales in relative terms, which we refer to as the average sales 
ratio.  By expressing average sales as a log difference, the competitiveness of market k, 
Mk, and domestic expenditure on movies, αYk, drop out.  With global fixed export costs 
and pure sunk costs, the average sales ratio is negatively correlated with variable trade 
barriers between an importer and an exporter. 
  A result similar to equation (10) holds if we remove firm heterogeneity and fixed 














δ .         ( 1 1 )  
In this model, which is similar to the standard monopolistic competition model, the 
variation of Suk occurs along the intensive margin, as in (10); however, this model also 
predicts all movies are exported, contrary to Melitz-type models. 
 
IIC Bilateral Fixed Export Costs 
Next, we consider a version of the model with bilateral fixed export costs.  To 
exhibit movies abroad, producers are now subject to a fixed cost that is specific to each 
destination market.  Showing a country-u movie in country k involves a fixed input of fuk 
units of country-k labor, showing the movie in country l involves an additional ful units of 
                                                 
19 The second line of (10) includes two approximations, one is that for small x, ln(1+x) ≈ x, and the second 
is that –tuk + tuk/(wk+1) = –tuk wk/(wk+1) ≈ –tuk.  In the estimation, we impose the first approximation, but 
not the second.  Since each of the specifications we derive includes the term, tuk/(wk+1), we incorporate as 
regressors interactions between trade barriers and the inverse of wages (see note 32).   13
country-l labor, etc. The other elements of the model are the same.  The assumption of 
bilateral fixed export costs is widely used in the literature on firm heterogeneity (e.g., 
Chaney, 2006; Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2007), though Melitz (2003) makes no 
explicit case for fixed export costs being bilateral or global in nature. 
For a country-u producer, showing movie j in country k now yields profit  
(1 ) jk u k u k wt
juk k uk k eA f w
−+ + + =−
λδ π .        ( 1 2 )    
Setting πjuk
 =0, the cut-off value of λj for a country-u producer to serve country k is 
     1l n ku k





=+ +++ λδ .        ( 1 3 )  
An increase in the importing-country wage, wk, not only increases the fixed export cost 
for country-u movies, but also makes their demand more elastic and lowers their markup 
(see (4)). Both effects decrease the profit of showing country-u movies in country k and 
increase  uk λ . These features are reminiscent of Melitz and Ottaviano (2005).   
Analogous to (9), we can use  uk λ  to derive: (a) the number of country-u movies 
exported to country k, and (b) the total sales of country-u movies in country k:  




∫λ λ  = exp( ), uu k Nd
κ λ κ −      
(b)  ()
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∞
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.        ( 1 4 )  
Equations (5) and (6) continue to hold for the domestic production and sales of country k 
movies.  Together with equation (14) they imply that: 
3
/
ln ln( ) ln ln 1
/1
uk uk k uk
uk k





=+ + + ++ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
   14








≈+ + + +
+
,      ( 1 5 )    
where  3 C  = 1 − lnd.  With bilateral fixed export costs and pure fixed costs, the average 
sales ratio is positively correlated with fixed and variable trade costs, and negatively 
correlated with importing-country movie expenditure.  Equations (10) and (15) highlight 
the importance of the nature of fixed export costs for the intensive and extensive margin 
of trade:  changing fixed export costs from global to bilateral reverses the sign of 
correlation between the average sales ratio and trade barriers.
 
 
IID Pure versus Partial Sunk Costs 
Our treatment of fixed production costs as being entirely sunk (incurred before a 
producer discovers its type) departs from what is standard in the literature.  Next, we 
allow fixed production costs to be incurred after a producer learns its type. 
Suppose a producer of movie h in country k incurs fixed production costs of b 
units of country-k labor, after she draws the demand shifter λh from the distribution G(λ). 
Of all the Nk movies that could be made, only nkk < Nk movies will actually be made.  
After the producer observes λh, she may decide not to make movie h at all, so as to avoid 
paying the fixed production cost.  Analogous to (12)-(14), we can derive (a) the profit of 
movie h, (b) the cutoff value of λ for movie h to be made, (c) the number of country-k 
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The fraction of movies that are made (nkk/Nk) varies with domestic market conditions, 
such as national expenditure and the expenditure share on movies, adjustment 
mechanisms that are absent under pure sunk costs. 
To see the importance of these mechanisms, consider domestic movie sales in 
country k, Skk.  Suppose the size of country k increases and the number of movies that 
have their λ’s drawn, Nk, remains unchanged.
20  The result will be that Skk rises.  From 
(3), there is a direct effect in that the revenue of each movie is higher.  From (16c), there 
is also an indirect effect in that the variable profit of each movie is higher, causing more 
movies to be made (nkk rises).  Does the number of movies made rise by more or less than 
total movie sales?  The indirect effect on ln(Skk) depends on the box office revenues of 
the infra-marginal movies relative to the rest of country-k movies (the extra-marginal 
movies), while the effect on ln(nkk) depends on the number of infra-marginal movies 
relative to the number of extra-marginal movies. Because infra-marginal movies are less 
popular than extra-marginal ones, they carry more weight in movie numbers than in 
movie sales.  As a consequence, the effect of Yk on ln(nkk) exceeds the indirect effect on 
ln(Skk).  Given the Pareto distribution of sales, the effect of Yk on ln(nkk) equals its total 
effect on ln(Skk). This means a change in market size has no effect on the intensive 
margin, Skk/nkk, and all adjustment in Skk occurs along the extensive margin.  In contrast, 
under pure sunk production costs, market size does not change the number of movies 
made, forcing adjustment in Skk to occur along the intensive margin. 
Using (16), we can derive the average sales ratio under alternative assumptions 
                                                 
20 By (16), a change in Nk has the same effects on nkk and Skk.    16
for fixed trade costs.  If fixed export costs are global, the sales of country-u movies in 
country k are described by equation (9) so that: 
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where  1 ln 1 uu Cb =− − λ .  The average sales ratio is negatively correlated with variable 
trade costs, as in (10), and is now correlated with importing country expenditure, unlike 
(10).  Domestic movie production adjusts along the extensive margin but movie exports 
adjust along the intensive margin so that importing country characteristics now have 
different impacts on the sales of foreign and domestic movies.  If fixed export costs are 
bilateral, the sales of country-u movies in country k are described by (14) such that: 
/
ln ln ln 1 ln
/1 1
uk uk uk uk uk uk
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.   (18) 
Equation (18) is similar to the predictions under the original setting of Melitz (2003).  
The average sales ratio is positively correlated with fixed and variable trade costs, as in 
(15), but uncorrelated with importing country characteristics, unlike (15).  Domestic and 
foreign movie sales each adjust along the extensive margin only so that importing 
country expenditure has the same impact on the average sales of both movie types. 
Table 1 presents equations (10), (15), (17) and (18) in a two-by-two matrix.  Each 
equation gives the relationship between the average sales ratio, trade costs, and other 
importing-country characteristics for one of the four models considered.  Specifications 
differ across the columns according to fixed export costs (global versus bilateral) and 
down the rows according to sunk production costs (pure versus partial).   17
 
IIE Empirical Specifications 
We use the predictions in Table 1 for our empirical specifications.  Let country u 
be the US, Sukt and nukt be total box-office revenue for US films and the total number of 
US films shown in country k in year t, and Skkt and nkkt be the total box office revenue and 
total number of domestically produced films shown in k in year t.  In Table 1, all four 
models predict that the average sales ratio is correlated with trade barriers. The two 
models with global fixed export costs (the left column) predict negative correlations with 
variable trade barriers, while those with bilateral fixed export costs (the right column) 
predict positive correlations with fixed trade costs. Let Xuk be a vector of covariates for 













αt + βXuk + εukt.        ( 1 9 )  
Under global fixed export costs Xuk contains variable trade barriers (in levels), with β < 0; 
under bilateral fixed export costs Xuk contains fixed trade costs (in logs) and variable 
trade costs (in level ratios with wages), with β > 0. 
  Many of the variables one would include in Xuk are proxies rather than direct 
measures of bilateral trade barriers, such as distance, having a common language, sharing 
a colonial history, etc.  It is difficult to determine whether these factors are associated 
with fixed or variable impediments.  An advantage of the specification in (19) is that we 
do not need to resolve the fixed-versus-variable-trade-barrier dilemma.  Since global and 
bilateral fixed export costs give opposite sign predictions for the correlation between the 
average sales ratio and trade barriers, testing one against the other simply involves 
                                                 
21 Recent work examines the correlation between the normalized number of firms exporting to a country 
and the size of the importing country (e.g., Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz, 2004; Arkolakis, 2007). In an 
Appendix, we show this correlation does not help us distinguish global versus bilateral fixed cost models.   18
determining whether the elements of the parameter vector β are positive or negative.  
Also, the double differencing implicit in the average sales ratio in (19) sweeps out of the 
estimation market competitiveness, the consumption share of movies, and number of 
movies that could be made for country k, all of which are hard to measure. 
  The second specification we estimate incorporates predictions from theory for the 
correlation between the average sales ratio, importing country size, and importing 
country labor costs.  Let Ykt be the vector of variables that measure movie expenditures 









= αt + βXuk + γYkt + εukt.         ( 2 0 )  
When the margin of adjustment for movie exports matches that for domestic movie 
production, importing country expenditure (adjusted by the wage) has symmetric impacts 
on movie exports and domestic movie output.  Expenditure is uncorrelated with the 
average sales ratio, implying γ = 0, as occurs along the diagonal of Table 1.   
Alternatively, where the margins of adjustment for movie exports and domestic movies 
do not align, we have that γ ≠ 0, as occurs along the off-diagonal of Table 1. 
 
III Data 
IIIA Exports of US Motion Pictures 
We evaluate the demand for US films and domestically made films using data on 
box-office revenues by country and year.
22  Box-office revenues are equivalent to the 
c.i.f. (customs, insurance, freight) value of motion-picture services consumed in cinemas, 
                                                 
22 Individuals consume services of new movie releases through cinemas and previous movie releases 
through TV and video rentals or purchases.  Distributors release movies to cinemas first, then to the pay per 
view, home video, cable TV, and broadcast TV markets in sequence, such that for a given film the services 
do not compete contemporaneously (e.g., for the typical movie there is a 150-200 day lag between the date 
of release in theatres on the US market and the date of release on the home video market) (Waterman, 
2005).  Unfortunately, data on film revenues by origin country from non-cinema sources are unavailable.   19
plus retail markups.  These revenues include import duties, transport costs, and other 
trade costs incurred in delivering the service to the consumer, as well as sales taxes and 
exhibition fees collected by cinemas.  They are consistent with the trade-cost-inclusive 
measure of sales used in the models developed in section II.  
Data on box-office revenues for 46 countries over the period 1995-2006 are 
available from Screendigest.com.
23  In each country, Screendigest reports the number of 
films screened, total film attendance, and total box-office revenues for films imported 
from the United States and films produced domestically.
24  Data cover first-run theatrical 
releases, which excludes older films, pornographic films, and movies shown only on TV 
or through the home video market.  For Europe, coverage begins in 1995, while for other 
regions it begins later.
25  Data are compiled from government agencies, national film 
bodies, film exhibitor and distributor associations, and company spokespeople.
26 
 One concern about the Screendigest data is it may represent a sample of countries 
selected for having large film markets.  Were the company to avoid countries that import 
                                                 
23 We use data from an industry source because government sources do not collect data on global film 
revenues.  The US government does not publish trade flows for movies.  UN Comtrade lists motion-picture 
trade as a commodity, Cinematographic Film Exposed or Developed (SITC 883), which is the reported 
value of physical shipments of film prints across borders.  Physical film shipments vastly understate film 
revenues.   Comtrade reports 2000 US film exports of $0.5 million to France, $0.5 million to Germany, and 
$6.5 million to the U.K., while Screendigest reports 2000 box-office revenues for US films of $513 million 
in France, $615 million in Germany, and $429 million in the U.K. (Hancock and Jones, 2003). 
24 Most box-office revenues are earned shortly after a film is released (De Vany and Walls, 1999), 
suggesting that revenues reported in a given year match the movies released in that year.  Some revenue 
data are available for films imported from countries other than the US, but the countries covered vary 
across destinations (e.g., while the UK is a major importer of movies from India, other countries are not). 
25 Screendigest covers a total of 56 countries (including the US).  For nine countries, however, data are 
available for box office revenues of US movies but not the number of US movies released. 
26 One issue is how to classify the nationality of a film.  Screendigest defines the origin country for a film 
by the location of the company that produces the film.  For a given movie, filming may occur in multiple 
locations.  Titanic (1997), for instance, was shot in Canada, Mexico and the United States, with most other 
production activities occurring in Los Angeles.  Screendigest considers the movie to be US in origin 
because the production companies, 20
th Century Fox and Paramount, are US based.  Despite Titanic’s 
filming locations, it is clearly a US movie.  The dialogue is in English, it was first released in the US 
market, and its cultural themes were targeted to a US audience.  The cultural discount involved in exporting 
Titanic to, say, Italy would logically have the US as the reference point.   20
few foreign films, our results on the extensive and intensive margins of trade would not 
be globally representative.  The Screendigest data include all of Europe and North 
America, and most of Asia, South America, and the more secular states in North Africa 
and the Middle East (see Table A2).  Missing are the Caribbean and Central America, 
Central Asia, most Islamic republics, Pacific island nations, and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which are regions dominated by small developing countries.  To determine whether film 
imports in these economies differ from the Screendigest sample, we examined film 
listings in major newspapers covering 25 markets in the missing regions.
27  In these 
countries, 1.4 new US movies are released on average each week, equivalent to 72 US 
movies a year, a level of imports roughly comparable to those by the Baltic counties, 
which are among the smaller markets in the Screendigest sample.  While we do not have 
information on box office revenues in these 25 countries, they are importing large 
numbers of US films, suggesting the countries excluded from Screendigest are not 
importing only a handful of movies.  
 
IIIB Trade Barriers in Motion Picture Trade 
  The method for testing the Melitz model that we develop in section II calls for all 
relevant trade barriers to be included in the estimation.  We include measures of 
geographic distance, cultural distance, levies on film imports, quantitative restrictions on 
film imports, and the protection of intellectual property rights.  
  For cultural trade barriers between the United States and its trading partners, we 
use indicators of linguistic dissimilarity between countries.  Following Fearon (2003) and 
                                                 
27 These countries are Bangladesh, Cambodia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Panama, 
Pakistan, Peru, Qatar, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, Uruguay, and Vietnam.      21
Wacziarg and Spolare (2006), we calculate linguistic distance as 1 minus the expected 
value of a linguistic similarity factor between a person randomly drawn from the United 
States and one randomly drawn from country k: 
  LDuk = 1 −  /15 lu ok lo lo pp G ∑ ∑ ,        ( 2 1 )  
where l indexes the ethnic groups that speak different languages in the US, o indexes 
those in country k and plu and pok are the population shares of language groups l and o in 
the US and country k. The linguistic similarity factor is /15 lo G , where Glo is the number 
of branches of the language tree that groups l and o share and 15 is the maximum number 
of branches.  We make linguistic similarity concave with respect to Glo because early 
divergence in the language tree (e.g., Indo-European vs. Japanese language families) is 
likely to signify greater cultural difference than later divergence (e.g., Italic vs. Germanic 
languages).  In section IV, we compare linguistic distance to other language variables.  
As another measure of culture dissimilarity, we use a related metric of religious distance.  
Data on the global language tree is from Fearon (2003) and on the global religion tree is 
from Fearon and Mecham (2007).  For additional measures of cultural distance, we use 
three indices of national values from Hofstede (2001):  an individualism index (intensity 
of perception that social ties between individuals are loose), a masculinity index (strength 
of belief that men should have assertive roles in society), and a power distance index 
(willingness to accept an unequal distribution of power).
28   
  One measure of policy trade barriers for the film industry is a country’s MFN 
                                                 
28 These indices are based on surveys IBM conducted of its global employees in 70 countries in the 1960s 
and 1970s.  US values (country averages) are 91 (44) for the individualism index, 62 (51) for the male 
dominance index, and 40 (59) for the power distance.  Relative to other countries, US respondents tend to 
be more likely to perceive social ties as being weak, to have stronger beliefs that men should have assertive 
roles in society, and to be more willing to accept an unequal distribution of power.     22
tariff on Cinematographic Film Exposed and Developed (HS 3706), which is the product 
category that covers trade in film prints across borders, from the UN Trains dataset.  
Since tariff data are unavailable in later years and reported inconsistently across countries 
in earlier years, we measure tariffs as the average value over the 1990-1998 period.  For 
the countries in our sample, the average MFN tariff on film imports is 5.6%. 
  A second source of data on trade barriers is an annual report by the Motion 
Pictures Association of America (MPAA) to the US Trade Representative. The MPAA 
report covers over 100 countries, listing for each the policies its members claim adversely 
affect their business.  Policies include  tariffs and levies ( tariffs on film imports, taxes on 
royalties for foreign films, levies on foreign video sales), quantitative restrictions (import 
quotas on foreign films, minimum screen time for domestic films, requirements that 
domestic short subjects be shown with foreign films), and other restrictions (subsidies to 
domestic movie producers, requirements that foreign films be printed locally, mandates 
that foreign-language movies be dubbed, restrictions on foreign investment in film or 
TV).  Since these measures are collected by an industry association, they may be subject 
to upward bias (if the MPAA exaggerates protection) and compressed variance (if the 
MPAA portrays all countries as restricting imports of US films).  Given heterogeneity in 
how countries define barriers, we use dummy variables to indicate whether a specific 
type of barrier is in place, averaged over 1991, 1999, and 2006.  Some film industry 
observers suggest that by the 1990s national industry barriers were insignificant in most 
countries, except China and a handful of former communist states (Waterman, 2005). 
  The protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) may also be important for 
exports of motion pictures.  Movie producers complain that many countries devote   23
insufficient effort to preventing individuals from selling pirated DVDs of US movies 
(Siwek, 2006).  McCalman (2005) finds that while moderate IPR protection encourages 
the spread of US movies, either very weak or very strong IPR protections decrease the 
speed with which US movies are released abroad.
29  The measures of IPR protection we 
use are (i) the Ginarte-Park (1997) index of patent protection in 2000; (ii) the Global 
Competitiveness Report measure of the strength of IPR protection, averaged over 2003 
and 2004; (iii) an indicator for whether the US Trade Representative has placed a country 
on the Priority Watch List for inadequate protection of intellectual property rights in a 
given year (under a congressionally mandated annual review process known as Special 
301); and (iv) an indicator for whether a country has entered into force the World 
Copyright Treaty of the World Intellectual Property Organization.
30   
 
IIIC Preliminary Data Analysis 
For the countries in our sample, the US is by far and away the largest source for 
movie imports.  For 2001-2006, the years for which we have complete data for most 
countries, Figure 1 shows that US movies account for over 60 percent of total box office 
revenues (domestic plus foreign movie sales) in all countries except China, France, the 
Philippines, and Korea.  In all but six countries, the US accounts for over 40 percent of 
the numbers of movies exhibited.  China is clearly an outlier.  Its government permits no 
more than 20 foreign films to be released in the country each year.  While other countries 
also place limits on film imports, they tend to be much less restrictive.  Between 2001 
and 2006, 12 countries set minimum requirements for the amount of screen time devoted 
                                                 
29 In related work, McCalman (2004) finds that while Hollywood studios are more likely to use licensing 
arrangements in countries with moderate IPR protection, they tend to use more integrated governance 
structures in countries with either high or low IPR protection. 
30 The WIPO Copyright Treaty (adopted in 1996) commits signatories to abide by specific definitions of 
copyrighted material and to enforce property rights over this material.  See http://www.wipo.int/.   24
to domestic films.  In only four countries are time limits in excess of 30% and even in 
these cases theatres can often circumvent limits by showing domestic features in the 
afternoon, on weekdays, or other times when demand is slack (Chung and Song, 2008).  
An alternative strategy is to take on a passive domestic partner for the distribution of a 
movie, which allows a film to qualify for domestic treatment (Waterman, 2005). 
Table 2 gives summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis and an 
Appendix Table A2 shows the mean values for the numbers of US and domestic films 
exhibited and box office revenues per film for US and domestic films over 2001-2006.  
During this period, 327 new domestically produced movies were shown on average in the 
US each year.  Consistent with the presence of fixed exports costs of some kind, the 
typical country in our sample imports less than half of US movies produced annually, 
with the mean number of US movies exhibited equal to 142.  Most countries are clustered 
around this mean, with the country at the 20
th percentile (Hungary) importing 106 US 
movies annually and the country at the 80
th percentile (Singapore) importing 162 movies.  
In contrast, box-office revenues per movie show wide variation.  Mean revenues per 
movie are $1.24 million (in 2007 US dollars), with the country occupying the 20
th 
percentile (Slovenia) at $0.10 million and the country occupying the 80
th percentile 
(Italy) at $2.37 million.  While the ratio of the 80
th to the 20
th percentile for number of US 
movies imported is 1.5, for box office revenues per US film it is 23.7.  This suggests that 
variation in US film exports occurs more at the intensive margin (revenues per film) than 
the extensive margin (number of films).  The wider variation in the intensive over the 
extensive margin is also seen in Figure 2, which plots log revenues per US movie against 
log number of US movies (each expressed as the deviation from sample means), averaged   25
by country over 2001-2006.  The standard deviation for revenues per movie is 1.39 
compared to 0.38 for the number of movies. 
As is the case with most products, the value of film imports is strongly increasing 
in the importer’s GDP.  Most of the variation in imports associated with market size 
occurs along the intensive margin.  Figures 3a and 3b plot the number of US movies 
imported and box-office revenues per US movie against importing-country GDP.
31  There 
is a weak positive relationship between the number of US films and GDP (slope 
coefficient of 0.04), and a strong positive relationship between revenues per US film and 
GDP (slope coefficient of 0.90). Figures 3c and 3d show that GDP is positively correlated 
with both revenues per domestic movie (slope coefficient 0.68) and number of domestic 
movies exhibited (slope coefficient 0.73).  Not surprisingly, larger countries produce 
more movies and have higher sales per movie. 
    To examine the intensive and extensive margins more formally, we follow Eaton, 
Kortum and Kramarz (2004) and use the identity,  ( ) () uit uit uit uit it it NR N R R R × ≡× , 
where Ruit is box office revenues for US movies in country i at time t, Nuit is the number 
of US movies shown in i at t, and Rit is aggregate box office revenues in i at t.  We then 
estimate the following two regressions (with robust t statistics in parentheses): 
       ( )
() ( )
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17 4 1 26 0
uit uit it it it lnN . . ln R R . lnR
..
=+ + + ε
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uit uit uit it it it lnR / N . . ln R R . lnR
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= −+ + − ε
   
By the logic of least squares, across the two regressions the constant and error terms sum 
to zero and the coefficients on each variable sum to one. The relative magnitude of the 
                                                 
31 All variables are expressed relative to the mean value across countries.   26
coefficients indicates how aggregate shocks affect the number of movies (the extensive 
margin) and revenues per movie (the intensive margin).  In response to a 10% increase in 
US market share in a country, revenue per US movie increases 6.8% and the number of 
movies 3.2%; in response to a 10% increase in total market size in a country, revenues 
per US movie increase 8.8% and the number of movies only 1.2%.  This is further 
evidence most adjustment in US movie exports occurs at the intensive margin.  
  The theoretical results presented in Table 1 suggest a simple way to identify the 
nature of fixed trade costs is to examine the sign of the correlation between trade barriers 
and the average sales ratio (average revenue per US movie/average revenue per 
domestically made movie).  Figures 4a and 4b plot the average sales ratio against 
geographic distance to the US and linguistic dissimilarity with the US.  Geographic and 
linguistic distance each has a negative correlation with the average sales ratio, which is 
consistent with global fixed export costs (first column of Table 1) and inconsistent with 
bilateral fixed export costs (second column of Table 1). 
We do not know whether geographic and linguistic distance affect variable or 
fixed trade barriers.  Yet, from the predictions in Table 1, it appears distance affects 
bilateral trade along the intensive margin, such that in motion pictures the relevance of 
distance for trade is in how it affects variable trade barriers. 
 
IV Estimation Results 
IVA Main Results 
  Table 3 presents estimation results for equation (19). The dependent variable is 
the log average sales ratio (average box office revenue per US movie relative to average 
box office revenue per domestic movie).  The specifications include correlates of trade   27
barriers in levels (as consistent with column (1) of Table 1) and logs (as consistent with 
column (2) of Table 1).
32  Our sample consists of 46 countries for the years 1995-2006, 
with data for some countries not beginning until after 2000.   
We first examine the role of linguistic distance.  In columns 1 and 2, the linguistic 
dissimilarity index (from equation (21)), is negative and precisely estimated (in logs or 
levels), indicating that the more linguistically different a country is from the US the less it 
spends per U.S movie it imports, relative to domestic movies.
33  Simply by adding 
linguistic distance to a regression with year dummies, the explained variation rises from 
5% to 27%.  The coefficient estimates imply that a country with linguistic dissimilarity 
one standard deviation below the mean (Switzerland) would have sales per US movie that 
are 66 log points higher than a country at one standard deviation above the mean 
(Estonia).  To see whether this result is driven by use of English, column 3 includes a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if a country has English as its primary language.
34  The 
English dummy is positive and precisely estimated, meaning that English-speaking 
countries spend more per US movie than non-English speaking countries.  In columns 4 
and 5, which include both language variables, the English dummy loses significance 
while linguistic dissimilarity remains precisely estimated.  It appears linguistic distance is 
about more than whether two countries speak the same language, also capturing other 
                                                 
32 The expressions in column (2) of Table 1 specify that the ratio of variable trade costs to wages (in levels) 
be included as regressors.  In unreported regressions, these ratios were jointly statistically insignificant, 
with p-values on the F-statistic for the hypothesis that they are jointly different from zero always greater 
than 0.5.  To limit the number of tables, we do not report regressions with these interactions. 
33 Since the index is close in value to 1, its value in logs is similar to its value in levels, which accounts for 
the similar coefficient estimates in columns (1) and (2).  The US has two major linguistic groups, English 
and Spanish.  English goes down to branch-level 6 (out of 15) on the language tree and Spanish goes down 
to level 10. By construction, the linguistic similarity index for the US never reaches the minimum value, 
meaning we might exaggerate true linguistic distance.  We tried two alternative metrics (aggregating the 
language tree up to 10 or 6 levels) and in both cases obtained very similar results to those in Table 3.  
34 In unreported results, we experimented with alternative language variables (whether a country has 
English as an official language, English as an open circuit language, English as a commonly spoken 
language, the fraction of the population speaking English).  The results were similar to those in Table 3.    28
aspects of cultural dissimilarity and divergent national experience.  In subsequent 
specifications, we use linguistic dissimilarity to measure linguistic distance. 
Columns 6-11 of Table 3 examine the role of geographical distance. Coefficients 
on linguistic dissimilarity become smaller in magnitude with the inclusion of geographic 
distance but remain highly significant.  The first geographic distance variable is a dummy 
that equals 1 if a country is an island (and so is likely to have a long history of trade with 
culturally distinct nations); its coefficient is positive and precisely estimated in all 
specifications.  We then consider two sets of variables, great circle distance to the US (in 
logs or in levels with a quadratic term) and the absolute values of longitudinal and 
latitudinal differences with the US.  For both sets of variables, the coefficients are 
negative and precisely estimated, meaning countries farther away from the US spend less 
per US movie.  In columns 10 and 11, which include both sets of distance variables 
together, great circle distance loses significance while longitude and latitude remain 
precisely estimated.  Distance in latitude matters about twice as much as distance in 
longitude, suggesting that barriers to trade in US movies are greater in going from the 
northern to southern hemisphere than in crossing the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans.  In later 
specifications, we use longitude and latitude to measure geographic distance. 
In accordance with Figure 4, the regression results in Table 3 show that the 
average sales ratio is negatively correlated with common measures of trade barriers.   
Countries more distant from the US – in terms of geography or language – have lower 
sales per US movie (relative to sales of domestic movies).  This suggests geographic and 
linguistic distance affect trade through their impact on variable trade barriers, rather than 
through their impact on fixed trade costs.  These results confirm that adjustment in   29
motion picture trade primarily occurs along the intensive margin.  With respect to Table 
1, the data prefer the specifications in the first column over the second. 
Table 4 presents estimation results for equation (20).  The specifications add 
correlates of movie expenditures and wages in importing countries: GDP, population, and 
income at the 20
th percentile (to capture wages for low skilled labor hired to exhibit 
movies),
35 the fraction of the population living in urban areas, and the number of cinemas 
in the country.  Columns 7 and 8 show that none of these variables has a precisely 
estimated coefficient (they are also jointly insignificant).  The average sales ratio appears 
to be uncorrelated with national income, labor costs, and the size of the domestic movie 
market.  Refering back to Table 1, the data appear to prefer the model in the upper-left 
cell over the other specifications.  From section II, this case is one in which the margin of 
adjustment for domestic movie production matches that for movie exports.  Given the 
negative and significant coefficients on the trade barrier variables, the results in Table 4 
imply that both domestic movie production and movie exports adjust primarily along the 
intensive margin, consistent with global fixed export costs and pure sunk costs. 
In Tables 5-7, we introduce additional trade barriers into the estimation.  Given 
the data appear to prefer the specification in the upper left of Table 1, we include 
measures of trade barriers in levels.  In all specifications, geographic and linguistic 
distances continue to be negative and significant (except for latitude distance in two 
instances).  Table 5 includes indicators of the protection of intellectual property rights.  
                                                 
35 Consistent with column (2) of Table 1, we include GDP and population in logs and wages in levels 
(results are similar with all variables in logs).  We use Grogger and Hanson’s (2008) estimates of income at 
the 20
th percentile to measure low skill wages in a country, which they construct by assuming that income 
has a log normal distribution.  With log normality, one can use the Gini coefficient and mean income (e.g., 
GDP per capita) to back out the variance of income and then use the mean and variance of income to 
estimate income at any percentile.  In unreported regressions, we used wages for low skill industries from 
the UNIDO industrial data base and obtained similar results.  In further unreported regressions, we included 
income at the 80
th percentile and wages in high skill UNIDO industries, also with similar results.   30
When entered individually, each of the indicators – the Ginarte-Park patent protection 
index, the Global Competitiveness Report measure of the strength of IPR protection, an 
indicator for whether a country is on the US Priority Watch List (for inadequate 
protection of IPRs), and an indicator for whether a country has signed the World 
Copyright treaty – is imprecisely estimated.  When entered jointly, one measure, the 
strength of IPR protection, is statistically significant at the 10% level.  It is positive, 
suggesting that stronger IPR protection leads to higher revenues per US film.  Overall, we 
find some support for the idea that IPR protection is a barrier to US movie exports, 
similar to McCalman’s findings that the strength of IPRs affects how US studios 
distribute movies abroad.  In unreported results, we found zero correlation between the 
average sales ratio and other measures of the importing country’s institutional 
environment, including the strength of enforcement of commercial contracts and the 
transparency of government policy (as measured by the World Economic Forum); 
financial development (the share of private credit to the private sector in GDP); and 
whether a country’s legal system has its origins in common law (as in the US).  
Moving on to policy barriers on movie imports, Table 6 adds tariffs on imports of 
exposed film and indicators constructed from the MPAA for whether a country imposes 
levies on foreign film revenues, has quantitative restrictions on movie imports, or has 
other restrictions on film imports.  The variables are imprecisely estimated, either 
individually or jointly.  The statistical insignificance of the tariff on exposed film is 
unsurprising, given that the value of physical film imports bears little relation to revenues 
earned by foreign movies (see note 23).  The lack of significance for the MPAA measures 
of trade barriers is perhaps more surprising.  It could reflect the ease with which movie   31
distributors and exhibitors circumvent restrictions on movie imports (e.g., taking on a 
passive domestic partner to distribute a movie) or that many barriers are no more than 
token attempts to prop up the domestic film industry (e.g., requirements in Argentina that 
a domestic short subject be shown with each full length foreign film or in Brazil that 
dubbing of foreign language films occur in the country).  It could also reflect a tendency 
of the MPAA to exaggerate trade barriers (to provoke USTR into action), which could 
bias up measures for countries in which actual barriers are small.
36 
  Finally, Table 7 introduces additional measures of national culture into the 
estimation in the form of the Hofstede indices.  Of the three indices, masculinity is 
statistically significant while individualism and power distance are not.  When the three 
indices are entered together, the masculinity index retains significance.  It appears that 
US movie sales are stronger in countries in which traditional beliefs favor men having 
assertive roles in society.  Action films with dominant male characters (e.g., Dirty Harry, 
James Bond, Rambo, The Terminator, Gladiator) have long been a staple of US movie 
studios, consistent with this finding.  The introduction of the cultural measures has no 
affect on the results for geographic or linguistic distance. 
 
IVB Alternative Distributional Assumptions 
  In deriving Table 1, we followed the literature by having the distribution of movie 
sales be Pareto.  Specifically, by (3), the distribution of domestic movie sales, shkk, is 
Pareto with the pdf 
1 / as
κκ κ
+  for s ∈ [a, ∞), where a = d(wk+1)exp(-wk-1)Ak is common 
across movies. This assumption is not innocuous.  In an Appendix, we derive the average 
                                                 
36 We constructed the three MPAA indicator variables from a larger number of indicators for whether a 
country has specific types of trade barriers (see the descriptions in section III).   In unreported results, we 
entered these indicators into the regression individually.  None was significant, except for an indicator of 
having a highly restrictive quota, which applied only to China.   32
sales ratio for our four models, without specifying a distribution for λ.  Reassuringly, 
under global fixed export costs and pure sunk costs – the case supported by the data – the 
relationship between the average sales ratio and trade costs is the same as in column 1 of 
Table 1.  Under bilateral fixed export costs, however, the results depend on the Pareto 
assumption.  Without it, variable trade costs may not drop out of the average sales ratio.  
Fixed and variable trade barriers may work against each other, making the correlation 
between trade barriers and the average sales ratio ambiguous. 
  To see if the data support the Pareto assumption, Figure 5 plots log box office 
revenues against log rank for movies exhibited on the U.S. market for even years in our 
sample period.
37  Across all movies, the rank-size relationship is nonlinear, meaning the 
Pareto assumption is violated.  Yet, it appears the rank-size relationship is linear for the 
upper and lower tails of the distribution, as in De Vany and Walls (1997, 2004).  In an 
Appendix, we show that we can approximate the empirical rank-size relationship with a 
spline function,
38 as would be consistent with a two-segment Pareto distribution, with one 
segment applying to the upper tail and one applying to the lower tail.  With a two-
segment Pareto, the rank-size relation has two linear segments joined at a kink.   
  With a two-segment Pareto distribution for movie sales, the distribution of movie 
types, λ, is a two-segment exponential, the pdf of which is illustrated in Figure 6. The 
shape parameters for the upper segment (more popular movies) and lower segment (less 
popular movies) are κ1 and κ2, with κ1 > κ2. The kink point is λT.  The pdf for λ is given 
by g2(λ) = 
22
2 /( ) A de P
κλ κ κ  for λ∈ [ln(d), λT] and g1(λ) = 
11
1 /( ) A de P
κλ κ κ  for λ ∈ [λT, +∞), 
                                                 
37 Data on US movie revenues are from AC Nielsen.  We lack box office revenues for individual movies in 
foreign countries and so can only examine the distribution of movie revenues for the US domestic market. 
38 For each year from 1997 to 2006, the R
2 in the spline function regressions is 0.99 or higher.  While some 
nonlinearity remains even with a spline, the additional explanatory power from accounting for this 
nonlinearity is minimal, as the spline alone explains over 99% of the variance in log revenues.   33
where P A = 1+
12 (/ ) (/ )
TT de de
λ κλ κ − .
39  When  κ1 = κ2 the two-segment exponential 
reduces to the one-segment exponential considered in section II. 
In an Appendix, we show for a two-segment exponential distribution for λ, that if   
λT <  kk λ  and λT <  uk λ ,           ( C 1 )  
then the predictions in Table 1 hold.  The unambiguous results in Table 1 obtain when 
both the export threshold,  uk λ , and the domestic production threshold,  kk λ , are above the 
kink point, λT.  This is because our analyses of exports and domestic production only 
concern the movies with type parameters above the thresholds  uk λ  and kk λ . If the kink 
point is below these two values, the analysis in section II goes through.  Thus, if (C1) 
holds, Table 1 is a valid basis for estimation.   
However, if (C1) does not hold, the predictions for the average sales ratio differ 
from Table 1 in all cases except global fixed export costs/pure sunk costs.  To see this, 
suppose λT >  kk λ  and λT > uk λ .  We can derive the average sales ratio by taking a second-
order Taylor expansion around  uk λ  =  kk λ  = λT, as shown in an Appendix.  Under bilateral 
fixed export costs and partial sunk costs, the approximation for the average sales ratio is  
 
22 /
ln ln ( ) ( )
/1
uk uk uk uk






≈++− −− ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
λ λλ λ      (22) 
where C = (κ1-κ2). Comparing (22) with (18), we see that under the one-segment 
exponential distribution, the second order terms of the Taylor expansion collapse to 0 and 
only the first order terms remain.  Similarly, if  uk λ  and  kk λ  are close the kink, λT, the 
                                                 
39 Since the two segments cross at λT, 
12
12 (/ ) (/ )
TT de de
λ κλ κ κκ = . The cdf of λ is 
22 (1 / ) /
A de P
κλ κ −  for λ ≤ 
λT and 
11 (/ ) /
A A Pde P
κλ κ −  for λ > λT. The cdf is continuous at λT and it converges to 1 as λ →∞.    34
second order terms will be close to zero. Regarding the other cases, under bilateral fixed 
export costs and pure sunk costs, the approximation for the average sales ratio is, 
2 /
ln ln ( )
/1







≈++− ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
λ λ ,     ( 2 3 )  
and under global fixed export costs and partial sunk costs it is, 
2 /
ln ln ( )
/1







≈+−− ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
λ λ .     ( 2 4 )  
To test whether (C1) holds, we estimate the average sales ratio augmented by the second 
order terms in (22)-(24) and see whether the terms enter significantly.  Under the null that 
(C1) is satisfied (or that there are global fixed export costs and pure sunk costs), the 
second order terms have zero correlation with the average sales ratio. 
  To derive the estimating equations for a two-segment Pareto distribution, let suk be 
the US box office revenue of the export cut-off movie with  uk λ  and let sT be the US box 
office revenue of the movie with λT at the kink of the two-segment exponential 
distribution.  By equation (2), ln(suk/ sT) =  uk λ  - λT.   And by equations (13) and (16b), 




λ − , which based on equation (20) 
implies we can use second-order terms of Ykt to control for ( kk λ - λT)
2.  Equation (22) 















=+ + + + + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
α βγ γ γ ε  .
 40 (25) 
                                                 
40 sT,t is US box office revenue in year t for the kink point of the spine log-rank-log-size relationship that we 
estimate using data on US movies (as shown in an Appendix). sukt is US box office revenue in year t of the 
movie with rank nukt (where we implicitly assume that exported movies are more popular than those not 
exported, and that the movies popular in the US are also popular in country k).   35
Under the one-segment Pareto distribution (or under global fixed costs/pure sunk costs), 
γ2 = γ3 = 0, while under the two-segment Pareto (for the three cases other than global 
fixed costs/pure sunk costs) γ2 ≠ 0 and γ3 ≠ 0. 
Table 8 shows regression results for (25).  In all specifications, the interaction 
terms are individually and jointly insignificant, suggesting the predictions in Table 1 are a 
valid basis for estimation.  These results support the conclusions from section IVA that 
the data favor a model with global fixed export costs and pure sunk costs. 
 
V Discussion 
  Fixed export costs figure prominently in recent theoretical trade models.  While 
current empirical research using manufacturing data suggests that these costs exist, it has 
little to say about their nature.  In services, which are undergoing rapid growth in trade, 
we know little about the impediments to global commerce. 
We develop a simple empirical method to test two alternative versions of the 
Melitz (2003) model, one in which fixed export costs are bilateral and another in which 
they are global.  To apply the Melitz model to trade in motion pictures, we extend it to a 
discrete choice setting and relax standard distributional assumptions.  Data on US film 
exports reject the bilateral fixed export cost model in favor of the model with global fixed 
export costs.  Trade in movies adjusts primarily along the intensive margin.  Even small 
countries important large numbers of US films, leaving only modest variation in the 
extensive margin of trade.  Along the intensive margin, average revenues per US film 
vary widely across countries and are negatively correlated with geographic distance, 
linguistic distance, and other measures of trade barriers.  The specification of the Melitz 
model preferred by the data turns out to be quite similar to that for the standard   36
monopolistic-competition model.  While the standard model fails to account for why no 
country imports the full set of movies the US produces, it characterizes the revenues 
earned by movies that are exported reasonably well. 
Our results depart sharply from the findings in the literature for manufacturing, in 
which adjustment in trade occurs primarily at the extensive margin.  One explanation for 
the difference in results between sectors is that fixed trade barriers for information 
services (at least as characterized by motion pictures) are dissimilar to those for 
manufacturing.  For information services, products are delivered through devices 
consumers already own (TVs, radios, computers, video game consoles, cell phones) or an 
existing global infrastructure that can be shared by producers (theatre complexes, 
telephone lines, satellite networks, the worldwide web), with individual products 
requiring little in the way of post-sale service.  Fixed barriers to trading information 
services include developing a marketing strategy to attract consumers and negotiating 
contracts over the delivery of intellectual property.  Once a marketing strategy and 
standard contract have been developed for one market, they may be easy to replicate in 
other markets, making the fixed costs of delivering information services primarily global 
in nature.  If fixed trade costs are global, it turns out that much of our understanding from 
standard models about how trade adjusts to trade barriers carries over.   37
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Appendix 
(A1) Predictions under CES Preferences  
Suppose the sub-utility for movies for the representative consumer in country k is uk = 
(1 ) / ' (1 ) / / (1 ) {   [ ] } ju k j kj kj uj uk uj cc
−− −
≠ + ∑∑ ∑
σσ σσ σ σ θθ δ , where θ represents the popularity of 
movie j and is drawn from the Pareto distribution whose cdf is 1 – a0
ς/θ
ς, with a0, ς > 0 
and θ ∈ [a0,  +∞). θkj = θj for all k. Movies are subject to ad valorem policy trade 
barriers, specified as tuk
’ > 1.  Other elements of the model are the same as in section II.  
 
CES preferences imply that the total sales of a country-u movie in country k are 
1' 1 ' 1 1 ' , juk j uk uk juk k st p A
σσ σσ θδ
−− −− =  for
'1 / kk k A YP
− ≡
σ α , where j indexes the movie, pjuk is the price 
of movie j net of policy trade barriers and Pk is the CES price index in country k. The 
total sales of domestically produced movie h in country k equal shkk = 
11 '
hh k k k p A
σσ θ
−− .  Price 
is a constant markup over marginal cost, wk.  
 
The intermediate steps for deriving the numbers and total sales of domestic and foreign 
movies are similar to section II and they are available upon request. Under pure sunk 
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.        ( X 4 )  
Equation (X1) is similar to the prediction of the standard monopolistic competition 
model, with no firm heterogeneity or fixed export costs. Equation (X4) is the prediction 
of the original setting of Melitz (2003).  Results under alternative distributional 
assumptions for θ can be derived using steps that are similar to section IVB and are 
available upon request.  
 
(A2) Derivation of Nk with Pure Sunk Cost and Global Fixed Export Cost 
Suppose there is only one sector, movies. There are m + 1 countries identical in size and 
wage, all with one sector, movies. Variable trade costs are symmetric for every country 
pair; i.e. tuk = t and δuk = δ for all u, k. By symmetry,    40
  wk = w, Ak = A for all k,           ( X 5 )  
where Ak is defined in equation (2). In a country k, after firm h draws its types, it makes 
profits πhkk =  / hkk hkk sp  if the movie is not exported, where shkk is by equation (3). Movie 
h makes additional variable profits πhkl =  /( ) hkl hkl kl spt +  in every export market l if it is 
exported, where shkl is by equation (2). By symmetry, the expression for the export cutoff 
θu, equation (8), becomes  





λ δ =+ + + + .         ( X 6 )  
The expected profit of a movie net of entry cost, prior to entry, is 
ln ()
u
hkk h d dG
λ
π πλ =∫  + 
[( ) ] ( )
u
hkk hkl k G h mw f d G
λ π πλ
∞
+− ∫ . As entry and exit drive expected profits to zero, 
π =wkfE. Plugging in the expressions for πhkk, πhkl and λu:  
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
1
u t w d
eA m d e
λ κδ κ κ
κ
−− − − −+ − +
−
 = fE + fGpx,  1( ) xu pG λ =− ,   (X7) 
where px is the (ex ante) probability that movie h is exported and px is a function of λu 
and A. The expected revenue of a movie, prior to entry, is 
ln ()
u
hkk h d rs d G
λ
λ =∫ + 
[] ( )
u
hkk hkl h sm s d G
λ λ
∞
+ ∫ = (w+1)(π +wfGpx)+  ()
u
hkl h td G
λ π λ
∞
∫ . The total sale of movies is 
Skk = Nkr.   Since expected profits are 0, total revenue equals total payments to labor; i.e. 
Skk = wkLk. Therefore,  
  Nk(w+1)(fE +fGpx) + 












= Lk.    (X8) 
Equations (X5)-(X7) determine the values of λu, w, A and px as we can choose A as the 
numeraire. Equation (X8) then determines the value of Nk.  
 
(A3) Correlation between (Normalized) Number of Exports and Importer Size 
Let µuk denote the market share of country-u movies in country k; i.e. µuk = Suk/Yk, where 
Yk is the size of country k. Then nuk/µuk =  ku k u k Y/ ( S / n ) . For the global fixed export cost 
(FEC) model, by equation (9b), 
1 (1 )
(1)














, where Mk is defined in 
equation (2). Mk tends to increase as more movies are shown in country k. In general 
equilibrium, the number of movies shown in country k is likely to increase with Yk and 
so nuk/µuk is likely to be positively correlated with Yk. However, it is difficult to derive the 
exact correlation between nuk/µuk and Yk without solving the full general equilibrium 

















so nuk/µuk is also positively correlated with Yk. 
 
 (A4) Average Sales Ratio with No Distributional Assumptions 
We summarize the results in Table A1. Below we derive the average sales ratio for the 
model with bilateral FEC and partial sunk costs, as well as its derivative with respect to   41
fixed trade costs. The proofs for the rest of the results in Table A1 are similar and 
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 is the share of the marginal movie ( uk λ ) in total revenues Suk, and 












 is the share of  uk λ  in the number of movies nuk. The marginal 
movie carries more weight in numbers than in revenues (see also section II.C.) and so 
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(A5) Estimating the Log Rank-Size Relation for US Movies 
Let sj denote the US box office revenue of movie j and rj denote its rank. By equation (3) 
sj = exp(λj)D0 where D0 = (wu+1)exp(-wu-1)Au is common across movies. Since the 
distribution of λ is a two-segment exponential as specified in section IVB, the distribution 
of s is the following two-segment Pareto. The cdf is Gs(s) = [1 
2 (/) as
κ − ]/PA
’ for s ∈ [a, 
sT] and Gs(s) = [PA
’ 1 (/) as
κ − ]/PA
’ for s ∈ [sT, ∞], where a = D0d, sT = exp(λT)D0, κ1 > κ2, 
PA
’ = 1+
12 (/ ) (/ ) TT as as
κκ −  and 
12
12 (/ ) (/ ) TT as as
κ κ κκ = . For a movie with sj ≥ sT, P(US 
box office revenue ≥ sj) = 1 – Gs(sj)  = 
1 (/ ) j as
κ /PA
’. In a sample of size n there are 
exactly rj movies with US box office revenues ≥ sj and so empirically, P(US box office 
revenue ≥ sj) = rj/n. Thus rj/n = 
1 (/ ) j as
κ /PA. Taking logs and re-arranging we get lnsj = 
αs1 – βs1 lnrj, where αs1 is a constant and βs1 = 1/ κ1. This is the first segment of the spline 
function. Analogously, for movies with sj < sT we get rj/n = (1 – 1/PA
’)+ 
2 ) / (
κ
j s a /PA
’. 
When (1 – 1/PA’) is small relative to rj/n, this expression can be approximated as lnsj = 
αs2 – βs2 lnrj, where αs2 is a constant and βs2 = 1/ κ2. This is the second segment of the 
spline function. Let rT denote the rank of the movie whose US box office revenue is sT. 
Let IT be the indicator variable that equals 1 if lnrj > lnrT and 0 otherwise. Then the spline   42
function is lnsj = αs1 – βs1 lnrj – (βs2 – βs1)IT( lnrj – lnrT). Estimating this function using 
data on box office revenues for US movies we get (t-statistics in parentheses): 
year  αs1  – βs1  – (βs2 – βs1) N R
2 lnrT 
1995 21.124 -0.947  -7.658  308 0.957 5.220 
 (88.63)  (-17.90)  (-25.78)      
1996 20.794 -0.827  -5.412  318 0.955 5.011 
 (145.13)  (-23.83)  (-24.70)       
1997 20.647 -0.758  -4.47  324 0.991 4.852 
 (13.00)  (-20.77)  (-55.96)      
1998 20.99 -0.854  -3.891  324 0.992 4.860 
 (126.67)  (-22.32)  (-52.04)       
1999 20.937 -0.833  -3.985  324 0.993 4.875 
 (145.37)  (-24.99)  (-58.88)       
2000 20.438 -0.684  -3.397  310 0.994 4.727 
 (135.79)  (-18.92)  (-50.45)       
2001 20.649 -0.734  -3.593  291 0.993 4.710 
 (126.26)  (-18.68)  (-49.22)       
2002 20.884 -0.786  -3.944  318 0.994 4.875 
 (136.37)  (-22.13)  (-56.21)       
2003 20.531 -0.681  -3.687  321 0.995 4.745 
 (167.70)  (-23.26)  (-68.73)       
2004 20.782 -0.777  -3.723  350 0.995 4.844 
 (166.67)  (-26.48)  (-64.94)       
2005 20.537 -0.724  -3.964  354 0.997 4.836 
  (162.95) (-24.72)  (-76.77)      
 
(A6) Derivation of Condition 1 (C1) 
If  λT <  kk λ , the movies above  kk λ  follow a one-segment exponential distribution, and so 
()
kk kj dG λ λ
∞
∫  =  exp( ) kk d
κ λ κ −  and  ()
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, where the last equality is 


































1 k w ++  + tuk + δuk + lnfuk, where the last equality is by equation (13). Plug these 
expressions into Table A1 and we can show that the expressions for the average sales 
ratio are the same as in Table 1.    43
(A7) Average Sales Ratio for a Two-Segment Pareto Distribution 
Below, we treat  uk λ  and  kk λ  as two independent variables (i.e. ∂ uk λ /∂ kk λ = 0). We have 
also considered expressing  uk λ  as a function of  kk λ  and trade costs using equations (13) 
and (16b). This alternative approach produces the same results.  
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( uk λ -λT) ( kk λ -λT),    (X9) 
 
where all the first and second order derivatives are evaluated at the point of expansion.  
 (P1)  h(λT, λT) = 0.  





























∂h/∂ uk λ  = 1 when  uk λ  =  kk λ  = λT.  
 (P3)∂h/∂ kk λ =
2 2
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which equals -1 when  uk λ  =  kk λ  = λT . 
  (P4) By (P2), ∂h/∂ uk λ does not depend on kk λ ; so 
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which equals - C when  uk λ  =  kk λ  = λT.  
  (P7) Plugging (P1)-(P6) into equation (X9) and we get equation (24).     44
Table A1:  Predictions for Average Sales Ratio without Specifying the Distribution of λ  
 
               Global Fixed Export Costs     Bilateral  Fixed  Export  Costs 
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   ∂fuk = 0, ∂δuk < 0, ∂tuk < 0, ∂Ak = 0, ∂wk ≈ 0.      ∂fuk > 0, ∂δuk ??, ∂tuk ??, ∂Ak < 0, ∂wk > 0. 
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∂fuk = 0, ∂δuk < 0, ∂tuk < 0, ∂Ak > 0, ∂wk < 0.      ∂fuk > 0, ∂δuk ??, ∂tuk ??, ∂Ak ??, ∂wk ??.   
           
Table A1 summarizes the expressions for the average sales ratio and the signs of its partial derivatives. We have used the 










 (see also notes 19 and 32). The models are arranged in the same order as in Table 1. 
The results hold for any distribution of λ. “∂x” is the partial derivative of the average sales ratio for xuk. The ∂wk terms are signed 






/∂wk is close to 0. “??” means the partial derivative cannot be signed.     45
Table A2 
Country  No. of domestic films No. of US films Revenue per domestic film  Revenue per US film
Lithuania 4 134 0.04  0.05
Latvia 2 92 0.04  0.05
Estonia 8 85 0.08  0.06
Romania 9 114 0.05  0.06
Slovak Republic  4 99 0.02  0.06
Iceland 5 128 0.18  0.09
Malaysia 12 159 0.45  0.10
Slovenia 7 114 0.04  0.10
Czech Republic  19 101 0.38  0.26
Philippines 103 186 0.39  0.26
Singapore 6 162 0.51  0.33
Hungary 22 106 0.19  0.38
Finland 14 106 0.79  0.39
Argentina 53 152 0.17  0.41
Thailand 26 137 1.06  0.41
Belgium 44 232 0.10  0.42
Turkey 15 125 1.21  0.43
New Zealand  5 152 0.84  0.49
Portugal 15 125 0.18  0.50
Indonesia 11 114 1.80  0.52
Poland 22 122 0.78  0.64
Ireland 4 102 0.33  0.65
Norway 15 118 1.20  0.67
Denmark 24 112 1.34  0.73
Austria 22 124 0.14  0.75
Sweden 27 115 1.22  0.97
Netherlands 31 132 0.67  1.00
Switzerland 47 122 0.20  1.03
Brazil 42 143 0.80  1.39
Russia 59 143 0.84  1.50
Spain 120 223 1.02  2.35
Italy 106 168 1.39  2.37
South Korea  77 124 5.17  2.49
Mexico 22 163 1.70  2.65
Australia 24 179 0.99  2.88
Canada 77 193 0.36  3.38
China 90 20 1.73  3.50
France 223 162 2.25  3.88
Germany 127 153 1.52  5.22
UK 89 169 3.65  6.30
USA 327 327 27.83  27.83
Revenue is in millions of 2007 US dollars.   46
Table 1:   
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
 
Variable N  Mean  St.  Dev. 
Number of US films  284  141.366  41.483 
Number of domestic films  284  46.345  52.865 
Revenue per US film  284  1.293  1.506 
Revenue per domestic film  284  0.859  0.965 
Log average sales ratio  284  0.386  0.958 
      
Linguistic dissimilarity index  284  0.751  0.143 
Log linguistic dissimilarity index  284  -0.304  0.185 
English official language  284  0.095  0.294 
      
Island 284  0.074  0.262 
Latitude difference with US  284  16.609  16.714 
Longitude difference with US  284  104.237  47.48 
Distance to US (ratio to mean)  284  1.008  0.407 
Log distance to US  284  -0.068  0.414 
Log GDP  284  26.146  1.328 
Log population  284  16.767  1.215 
Income, 20th percentile (ratio to mean)  281  1.002  0.671 
      
Ginarte-Park index  271  0.723  0.156 
Intellectual property protection index  284  0.695  0.161 
Super 301 action  284  0.141  0.348 
Ever sign WCT  284  0.345  0.476 
      
Tariff on exposed film   219  0.028  0.081 
Levies tariff on movies  284  0.378  0.371 
Has quantitative restrictions on movies  284  0.455  0.374 
Has other restrictions on movies  284  0.388  0.320 
      
Individualism index  273  0.592  0.208 
Masculinity index  273  0.498  0.234 
Power distance index  273  0.516  0.217 
   
Sample is 284 observations on 46 countries over period 1995-2006.   48
Table 3:  Average Sales Ratio and Trade Barriers 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
log linguistic dissimilarity  -2.448     -2.725  -1.922  -1.831  -1.879  
  (0.540)    (0.666)  (0.545)  (0.518)  (0.555)  
linguistic dissimilarity     -3.198     -3.383  -2.480  -2.110  -2.559 
   (0.685)    (0.839)  (0.701)  (0.710)  (0.753) 
English official language      0.543  -0.341  -0.202                           
      (0.279)  (0.409)  (0.375)                           
Island            1.524 1.528 0.654 0.951 1.468 1.449 
            (0.306) (0.314) (0.269) (0.278) (0.300) (0.344) 
latitude  diff.  with  US       -0.015  -0.014     -0.014  -0.018 
        (0.004)  (0.004)     (0.005)  (0.007) 
longitude  diff.  with  US        -0.008  -0.008     -0.007  -0.009 
        (0.002)  (0.002)     (0.002)  (0.004) 
log  distance  to  US          -0.788    -0.179   
          (0.150)    (0.229)   
distance  to  US           -1.762    -0.638 
           (0.782)    (0.981) 
distance  to  US  squared           0.317    0.338 
           (0.280)    (0.293) 
             
R
2  0.269 0.273 0.073 0.276 0.276 0.381 0.377 0.340 0.344 0.383 0.382 
N  284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 
 
The specification is that in equation (19).  The dependent variable is sales per US movie relative to sales per domestic movie.  
Coefficient estimates for year dummies are not shown.  Standard errors (clustered by importing country) are in parentheses.     49
Table 4:  Average Sales Ratio, Market Size, and Labor Costs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
log linguistic dissimilarity  -1.813  -1.911  -1.909  -2.143         
  (0.576) (0.562) (0.588) (1.690)         
linguistic dissimilarity           -2.323  -2.473  -2.437  -2.463  
       (0.745)  (0.721)  (0.743)  (2.088) 
Island  1.488 1.525 1.516 2.689 1.484 1.528 1.509 2.741   
  -0.299 -0.304 -0.321 -1.077 -0.302 -0.311 -0.323 -1.092 
latitude  diff.  with  US  -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 -0.038 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.035   
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.027) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.027) 
longitude  diff.  with  US  -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009   
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) 
          
log  GDP  0.041  0.079  0.099  0.049  0.089  0.101 
  (0.061)  (0.186)  (0.431)  (0.061)  (0.190)  (0.436) 
log  population   0.034  -0.045  -0.165  0.040  -0.047  -0.141 
   (0.072)  (0.178)  (0.431)  (0.072)  (0.181)  (0.429) 
income, 20th percentile      -0.066  0.092      -0.066  0.066 
     (0.309)  (0.445)    (0.316)  (0.467) 
log  urbanization  rate     -0.090      -0.057 
      (1.024)      (1.007) 
log number of cinemas        0.102        0.089 
      (0.264)      (0.263) 
R
2  0.384 0.383 0.387 0.400 0.381 0.379 0.384 0.395 
N  284 284 281 262 284 284 281 262 
Standard errors (clustered by importing country) are in parentheses.  See notes to Table 3 for other details.   50
Table 5:  Average Sales Ratio and Protection of Intellectual Property 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
linguistic dissimilarity index  -2.316  -2.570  -2.376  -2.387  -2.534 
  (0.719) (0.739) (0.747) (0.772) (0.749) 
Island  1.462 1.739 1.514 1.290 1.461 
  (0.358) (0.388) (0.324) (0.393) (0.468) 
latitude diff. with US  -0.014  -0.023  -0.016  -0.012  -0.017 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) 
longitude diff. with US  -0.008  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.008 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
log GDP  -0.160  -0.096  0.078  0.166  -0.257 
  (0.268) (0.208) (0.191) (0.210) (0.294) 
log  population  0.224 0.135 -0.025 -0.095 0.347 
  (0.264) (0.205) (0.186) (0.192) (0.271) 
income, 20th percentile  0.042  -0.211  -0.062  -0.041  -0.112 
  (0.322) (0.288) (0.314) (0.317) (0.304) 
       
patent  protection  index  1.378      1.264 
  (1.048)      (1.100) 
IPR protection index    1.790      2.246 
   (1.215)    (1.258) 
on US priority watch list      -0.125    0.164 
     (0.176)  (0.178) 
World Copyright Treaty        0.304  0.405 
       (0.338)  (0.350) 
       
R
2  0.400 0.398 0.385 0.398 0.433 
N  268 281 281 281 268 
 
Standard errors (clustered by importing country) are in parentheses.  See notes to Table 3 
for other details.   51
Table 6:  Average Sales Ratio and Policy Trade Barriers 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
linguistic  dissimilarity  index -3.875 -2.648 -2.448 -2.378 -3.141 
  (1.010) (0.808) (0.720) (0.754) (0.931) 
Island  1.432 1.658 1.519 1.488 1.243 
  (0.452) (0.394) (0.337) (0.390) (0.618) 
latitude  diff.  with  US  -0.021 -0.019 -0.017 -0.016 -0.019 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
longitude  diff.  with  US  -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
log  GDP  -0.058 0.095 0.061 0.094 -0.075 
  (0.274) (0.218) (0.219) (0.189) (0.317) 
log  population  0.099 -0.089 -0.030 -0.044 0.189 
  (0.261) (0.220) (0.182) (0.189) (0.288) 
income,  20th  percentile  -0.097 -0.155 -0.025 -0.068 -0.035 
  (0.348) (0.390) (0.368) (0.313) (0.424) 
       
tariff on exposed film  -0.066        0.083 
  (1.030)      (1.387) 
levies tariff on foreign movies  0.328      0.246 
   (0.460)    (0.585) 
has  quantitative  restrictions     0.066  0.235 
     (0.286)  (0.383) 
has  other  restrictions      -0.050  -0.843 
      (0.471)  (0.857) 
       
R
2  0.482 0.396 0.384 0.384 0.497 
N  216 281 281 281 216 
 
Standard errors (clustered by importing country) are in parentheses.  See notes to Table 3 
for other details.   52
 
Table 7:  Average Sales Ratio and Other Cultural Barriers 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
linguistic  dissimilarity  index -2.258 -1.861 -2.571 -1.964 
  (0.916) (0.671) (0.854) (0.694) 
Island  1.492 0.864 1.399 0.741 
  (0.309) (0.313) (0.406) (0.419) 
latitude diff. with US  -0.017  -0.007  -0.015  -0.005 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
longitude  diff.  with  US  -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
log  GDP  0.073 0.044 0.129 0.087 
  (0.189) (0.171) (0.208) (0.180) 
log  population  -0.020 -0.031 -0.106 -0.096 
  (0.175) (0.166) (0.212) (0.188) 
income, 20th percentile  -0.080  0.209  0.016  0.291 
  (0.324) (0.254) (0.358) (0.290) 
      
individualism  index  0.367    0.054 
  (0.672)    (0.635) 
masculinity  index   1.505  1.506 
   (0.392)  (0.410) 
power distance index      0.656  0.713 
     (0.999)  (0.820) 
      
R
2  0.396 0.487 0.402 0.498 
N  270 270 270 270 
 
Standard errors (clustered by importing country) are in parentheses.  See notes to Table 3 
for other details.   53
Table 8:  Testing for Alternative Distributions 
    (1) (2) (3) 
linguistic dissimilarity index -2.437  -2.328  -2.332 
  (0.743) (0.871) (0.872) 
island  1.509 1.438 1.437 
  (0.323) (0.385) (0.385) 
latitude diff. with US  -0.016  -0.013  -0.013 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
longitude diff. with US  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
log GDP  0.089  15.010  15.055 
  (0.190) (8.804) (8.798) 
log population  -0.047  -14.145  -14.230 
  (0.181) (7.141) (7.088) 
Income, 20th percentile  -0.066  -10.538  -10.543 
 (0.316)  (18.537)  (18.536) 
ln(suk/ sT)   -0.228  -0.237 
   (0.165)  (0.154) 
ln(suk/ sT)
2   0.008  0.004 
   (0.041)  (0.038) 
Log GDP
2   -0.667  -0.670 
   (0.383)  (0.380) 
Log population
2   -0.359  -0.361 
   (0.331)  (0.329) 
Income
2   -1.009  -1.018 
   (1.104)  (1.097) 
Log GDP*income    0.886  0.893 
   (1.887)  (1.883) 
log population*income    -0.551  -0.559 
   (1.866)  (1.862) 
log GDP*log population    1.065  1.073 
   (0.692)  (0.686) 
F statistic interaction terms    1.610  1.430 
(p value)    (0.132)  (0.196) 
R
2  0.384 0.453 0.453 
N  281 281 281 
 
Notes to Table 8:  The specification is that in equation (25).  Coefficient estimates for year 
dummies are not shown.  Standard errors (clustered by importing country) are in parentheses.  In 
column 2 ln(suk/ sT) is calculated based on estimation results of a spline function for the log rank-
size relationship using the full sample of US movies in AC Nielsen in each year; in column 3 the 
variable is calculated based on estimation results using a restricted sample of US movies.  The F 
statistic is for the null that the variables ln(suk/ sT) to log GDP*log population are jointly zero.   54
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Figure 3:  Movie imports and country size, 2001-2006 
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(b) Box-office revenues per US movie 
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Figure 3:  Domestic movie production and country size, 2001-2006 
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Figure 4:  Relative average revenue per US movie and trade barriers, 2001-2006 
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Figure 6:  Two Segment Exponential Distribution 
λ 
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